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Abstract
In Der logische Aufbau der Welt, first published in 1928, Carnap aims to rationally re-
construct all objects of cognition by logico-definitional means. As a result, he intends
to obtain a fully objective framework in which scientific discourse can take place.
This is made possible by the novel method of ‘purely structural definite description’
of all scientifically relevant objects, which is first introduced in the Aufbau. Key to
the attainment of this goal is the notion of ‘foundedness’, which Carnap presents as a
new basic notion of logic, in order to establish a link between the purely conventional
world of logical and mathematical knowledge and the empirical world of knowledge
of scientific objects. This idea experienced major criticism by Friedman (1999a,b)
since he considers it to lead to the demolition of the boundary between those two
worlds. In this essay, we want to defend foundedness against Friedman’s critique by
arguing that its introduction is necessary within Carnap’s logicist world of thought
to deal with a more fundamental problem: the demarcation of the empirical parts of
the Aufbau. In the last section, we will give an outlook on the actual cause for the fail-
ure of the Aufbau, the lack of a principle to determine the truth of the instances of the
basic relation in the Aufbau, andwewill show how this can contribute to the explana-
tion of Carnap’s future philosophical development and retrospective self-evaluation.
This essay serves as a dense informal sketch for a later extensive formal treatment of
this reading of foundedness and focuses on its implications for the interpretation of
Carnap’s post-Aufbau development.
Keywords: foundedness•Carnap•Aufbau•ViennaCircle• structural description•definite description
• verificationism
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[The Vienna Circle] assumed that there was a certain rock bottom of knowledge of the
immediately given, which was indubitable. Every other kind of knowledge was supported
by this basis and therefore likewise decidable with certainty. This was the picture which I
had given in the Logischer Aufbau.
Carnap (1963, p. 57)
[S]uch a phenomenalist-foundationalist conception is hardly in evidence in the text of the
Aufbau itself.
Friedman (1999b, p. 145)
The structure of this essay
Why is Rudolf Carnap’s late self-evaluation of his first monograph The Logical Con-
struction of the World1 (‘Der logische Aufbau der Welt’) so much at odds with his ori-
ginal text? Is it due to psychological peer pressure in the Vienna Circle, as Michael
Friedman (1999b) suggests? This essay will argue that both the success and the even-
tual failure of the notion of ‘foundedness’ will be the key to a purely philosophical
explanation of Carnap’s verificationist turn.
To build our argument, we will begin by reconstructing the main argument of
the Aufbau. In section 1 of this essay, we will thus first semi-formally reconstruct
Carnap’s investigation of the form of scientific sentences, and we will show how this
contributes toCarnap’s notion of objectivity under a neo-Kantian reading of the Auf-
bau. Second, we will briefly outline the basic elements of the constitutional theory,
which is presented in the Aufbau, including an investigation of the sources of the em-
pirical and the analytic components of it. Based on that, the elimination procedure of
the basic relation of the constitutional theory, including the introduction and elucid-
ation of the notion of ‘foundedness’, will be reconstructed. After that, we will present
the critique in Friedman (1999a) of the demolished boundaries between analytic and
empirical knowledge.
Section 2 is dedicated to the status of logic andmathematics in the Aufbau. First,
the logicist notions which can be found in the Aufbau will be extracted. Second, we
will explain Carnap’s differentiation between logical value and epistemic value. After
this, the reconstructive part of this essay will be finished, and we will merge the lines
of thought presented above in our main argument in section 3. Here, we start off
by presenting the three conditions that a constitutional theory must satisfy so that it
does not collapse into triviality, against Carnap’s logicist backdrop. From there, we
1The English terms ‘construction’ (the term closer to English language use) and ‘constitution’ (the term
closer to the original and better fittingCarnap’s aim) are used interchangeably in this essay, both referring
to Carnap’s ‘Konstitution’.
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will show that the first condition, the absence of a purely conventional truth at any
point of the constitution, is necessarily satisfied beforewe showhow the introduction
of foundedness is an ideal response to the concerns raised by the second condition.
In section 4, we will present indicators in favour of the thesis that the third cri-
terion established in section 3.1 is not met in the Aufbau and that this fact leads to its
failure. Eventually, we will give an outlook on how this thesis can explain Carnap’s
future philosophical development as well as how it can—unlike Friedman (1999b,
chapter IV)—provide a philosophical explanation for the apparent self-contradiction
in Carnap’s autobiography.
1 THE NOTIONOF ‘FOUNDEDNESS’ IN THE AUFBAU
1.1 OBJECTIVITY BY STRUCTURAL DEFINITE DESCRIPTION
1.1.1 Purely structural scientific statements
What is the form of scientific statements, according to Carnap’s Aufbau, first pub-
lished in 1928 and here referred to as Carnap (1998)? In Carnap (1998, §§10-16)
several distinctions and semi-formal definitions are introduced, which we want to
reconstruct briefly:
1. A relational description (‘Beziehungsbeschreibung’) of an object A relative to a
domainD is the set of all relations betweenA and other objects inD. Relational
descriptions do not contain the set of the properties of A (cf. §10).
2. A structural description (‘Strukturbeschreibung’) of an object A relative to a do-
main D is a relational description that only contains the formal properties of
each element of the relational description. Structural descriptions do not con-
tain the relational descriptions themselves (cf. §11).
There are two ways to give a complete structural description: first, by giving
its unlabelled graph (‘(nicht mit Gliedernamen versehene[]) Pfeilfigur’); second,
by giving a list of all pairs of items in Dwhich satisfy the relation, but in which
all items of the list are labelled by terms that only make sense within the list
(such as randomly chosen numbers), for all relevant relations. This list is called
a number pair list (‘Nummernpaarliste’).
3. A scientific statement makes sense only if the meaning of all names of the ob-
jects it contains can be given.
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4. The meaning of a name of an object can be given either by an ostension (‘Auf-
weisung’), meaning, ‘pointing at it, making it perceivable’, or by a definite de-
scription (‘Kennzeichnung’).
5. A definite description gives exactly the number of descriptive properties of the
object in question such that it can be uniquely determined, relative to its do-
main. Carnap emphasises here that those properties cannot be found a priori
but only by utilising the domain, meaning that theremust be at least one object
in the domain that satisfies the descriptive properties (cf. §13).
6. A structural definite description is a definite descriptionwhich gives the descript-
ive properties in the form of a structural description of an object in question,
relative to its domain.
7. By
(a) the hypothesis that there is only one domain for scientific statements as
presented in §4, and
(b) the hypothesis that purely structural definite descriptions are possible
within the domain of scientific statements (cf. §15),
Carnap concludes that every scientifically meaningful statement can be trans-
formed into a structural one, which only consists of structural definite descrip-
tions. It is important to keep in mind here that the truth of both hypotheses,
(a) and (b), depend on the successful construction of a constitutional system, as
Carnap admits. The fulfilment of this task is attempted by him in §§106-156.2
1.1.2 Objective scientific language
What is the use of purely structural definite descriptions then? In other words: for
what reason should we choose them over ostensions to give our scientific sentences
meaning? Ostensions are dependent on the individual perception ofmaterial objects.
But this is subjective in nature. Since science strives for objectivity, it is imperative
not to depend on one single epistemic subject’s perception but to use data from a
plurality of epistemic subjects; specifically, what they agree upon. Here, the struc-
tural definite descriptions come into play: if one single purely structural relational
network, in which every object of the domain can be accommodated by the use of
2We are aware that these definitions partly reoccur in a more formal manner later in the Aufbau. In par-
ticular, the precise definition of structure can be found in §34. Nevertheless, this semi-formal account
should be sufficient for our present purposes.
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purely structural definite descriptions, is used by all epistemic subjects at once, it can
serve as the conceptual framework in which inter-subjective scientific communica-
tion can take place. The structural definite description for every object, again, de-
pends on the agreement of observational data given by different epistemic subjects
(cf. Carnap, 1998, §16). In other terms, scientists can communicate with one an-
other and compare their results, meaning the same objects, by restricting themselves
to speaking about formal properties of the relations of the objects they observe, al-
though their qualitative perception may diverge significantly. The identity of objects
would in this objective scientific language, which the constitutional theory3 of the
Aufbau aims for, be restricted to having an isomorphic relational structure within
the network.
1.1.3 The neo-Kantian interpretation of the Aufbau
This notion of objectivity in the Aufbau has first been emphasised by the so-called
neo-Kantian interpreters of the Aufbau, such as Sauer (1985) and, mostly, Friedman
(1999a). These authors bring Carnap’s pursuit of objectivity in line with his neo-
Kantian heritage, rooted in the Southwest school and the Marburg school. This is
seen as an opposition to the earlier Aufbau interpreters, who tend to emphasise the
Russellian and empiricist influence on Carnap’s Aufbau (cf. Pincock, 2009, pp. 956-
959). In this essay, we largely agreewith the neo-Kantian interpretation of theAufbau
as offered by Michael Friedman, on which our critique will be based. Nonetheless,
we will not investigate this distinction any further for our present purposes.
1.2 THE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN THE AUFBAU
1.2.1 Methodical solipsism
In §§106-156 of the Aufbau, the actual construction of a constitutional system takes
place. In his preceding investigations, Carnap identifies two possible domains in
which a constitutional system can be based: first, the physicalistic domain, as de-
scribed by what he calls ‘thing-language’; second, the psychic domain, which can
either be restricted to the content of one’s ownconsciousness (‘eigenpsychischeBasis’)
or include the contents of other people’s consciousness as well (‘allgemeinpsychis-
che Basis’). Although Carnap sees the advantages of a ‘physicalistic’ basis, he bases
3The term ‘constitutional/constructional theory’ can either refer to an actual system such as the onewhich
is presented in the Aufbau or to the discipline of studying such systems.
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the constitutional system presented in the Aufbau on the content of one’s own con-
sciousness. This is for the reason that an individual-psychic basis seems to reflect the
order of epistemic primacy (‘erkenntnismäßige Primarität’), which is the logical or-
der of cognition: the cognition of some objects is a necessary condition of—and thus
epistemically prior to—the cognition of others, which is in turn epistemically prior
to the cognition of different entities, and so forth. He refers to this purelymethodical
decision of the basis of his constructional system asmethodical solipsism (‘methodis-
cher Solipsismus’) (Carnap, 1998, §§54-60).
1.2.2 The empirical basic relation and analytic level forms
Carnap’s constitution has twomain components, one empirical and one analytic. The
empirical component is what is known as the basic relation (‘Grundbeziehung’), the
recollection of similarity (‘Ähnlichkeitserinnerung’), between two elementary exper-
iences, which are elements of the content of the (fixed and highlighted but not spe-
cifically named) epistemic subject’s4 consciousness. These are the basic elements of
the constitution and cannot be analysed themselves although they can be ascribed
components by the synthetic method of quasi-analysis5 (cf. Carnap, 1998, §§61-83;
§108-109). The analytic component is the constitution of all other epistemologic-
ally, or scientifically, relevant objects in a purely logical manner from the basic re-
lation by means of definition. The underlying logic Carnap exploits in the Aufbau
is a type-theoretic logic such as that developed by Russell and Whitehead. Carnap
determines two relation-theoretical entities as the two primitive constituents of the
chain of extensional definitions, in which his constitutional theory consists: classes
and relations, known as level forms of the constitution (‘Stufenformen’) (cf. Carnap,
1998, §§27-42; §106).
1.2.3 The layout of the constitution
What is constituted in the Aufbau? What objects are epistemologically—i.e., for him,
scientifically—relevant for Carnap? Three levels (‘Stufen’) of objects are dealt with in
the exemplary constitution in the Aufbau: first, Carnap starts by defining all objects
4Here also referred to as ‘one’.
5The methodology of quasi-analysis (see Carnap, 1998, §71) plays a key role in Carnap’s system. It allows
us to determine the quasi-components of the states of consciousness, which are primitives of the con-
struction and, hence, unanalysable, can be subject to analysis. The basic idea is that some (quasi-)entities
are defined in terms of equivalence relations amongst others. Quasi-analysis is closely akin to Frege’s
‘logical abstraction’ (cf. Frege, 1884, §62). For a detailed discussion see Richardson (1998, pp. 51-64) and
Goodman (2012, ch. 5).
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that are cognised by one’s own consciousness (cf. Carnap, 1998, §§108-121). Partic-
ularly important in this part of the constitution is §119, which is dedicated to the
detailed demonstration of the reduction of every scientific statement to a statement
about the basic relation, using the example of the statement about three-dimensionality
of the colour body (cf. also Carnap, 1998, §153). This first part is the only part of the
constitution that is carried out in full logico-mathematical rigour. Later parts are
limited to rough battle plans for carrying out the constitution. So is the second part,
where Carnap constitutes physical objects as dealt with in the thing-language6 such
as space, visual objects, one’s own body, or other people (cf. Carnap, 1998, §§123-
138). The upper levels of the constitution are objects of other people’s consciousness
(cf. Carnap, 1998, §§139-149) and, finally, mental objects, the subject of the human-
ities, by their mental manifestations and in line with the constitution of their phys-
ical documentations (cf. Carnap, 1998, §§150-151). From here, Carnap hints at the
constitutions of other kinds of objects, for which he names values as an example (cf.
Carnap, 1998, §152).
1.3 THE ELIMINATION OF THE BASIC RELATION
1.3.1 Objectivisation by elimination
At this point in the Aufbau, before Carnap starts discussing the philosophical implic-
ations of his constitutional results in book V, Carnap completes the circle in terms of
his prior investigations on objective scientific statements, as dealt with before in that
essay: so far, he has only given a structural definite description in logical-relation
theoretical terms based on the empirical relation of recollection of similarity. But, as
we have seen before, an objective conceptual space for science to operate in requires
reduction to definite descriptions that are purely structural and, thus, do not contain
ostensible content. This means that Carnap needs to eliminate the basic relation. He
attempts to show that this is possible in §§153-155 and we want to reconstruct this
elimination process below.
1.3.2 The elimination procedure
Initially, Carnap identifies two requirements the elimination has to meet.
6The language using a materialistic domain and, hence, accepting the existence of everyday objects. The
thing-language is also the language standardly employed in the empirical sciences (cf. Carnap, 1998, §52).
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Structural description of the basic relation First, since the choice of the basic re-
lation is not precisely determined before constructing a constitutional system,7 there
is the opportunity to choose a different one. As the introduction of a different basic
relation causes all other objects in the constitutional system to be changed into state-
ments about it rather than the original basic relation, the properties of the objects
within the new constitutional network, the form of which is relative to the new basic
relation, would also shift accordingly. This means that the properties of the objects
relative to the constitutional theory are bound to the basic relation and, conversely,
that the basic relation can be described definitely by the properties of the objects of a
constitutional theory within such. This is only limited by the choice of objects, used
for that reason: the objects have to be at a sufficiently high level of the constitution,
i.e. the formulae, constituting the objects relative to the constitutional theory must
be of sufficiently high complexity (cf. Carnap, 1998, §153).
Foundedness The second requirement is what Carnap calls foundedness (‘Fun-
diertheit’) of the relation on which the first restriction is applied. When defining
this restriction, Carnap seems to pull off a trick by calling it an undefinable notion.
Thismeans that it can neither be definedwithin our framework nor can it be a purely
logical concept. Carnap suggests a solution to this problem by introducing the no-
tion of foundedness as a logical term. We will skip this problem for the moment, and
we will return to it later. Although Carnap does not offer a definition of the notion,
he elucidates it: a relation is founded if it can be experienced. Thus, although the
statements, derivable from a constitutional theory, change if its basic relation is re-
placed by another, the empirical content of those statements (all of them combined)
does not (cf. Carnap, 1998, §154). In §155 Carnap carries the procedure of eliminat-
ing the basic relation by imposing the two restrictions, mentioned above, using the
statement on the three-dimensionality of the colour body as the high-level sentence
required to meet the first restriction.8
1.4 FRIEDMAN’S CRITIQUE OF FOUNDEDNESS
Carnap’ consideration of foundedness as a primitive logico-mathematical term, is the
major bone of contention in Friedman (1999a, chapter III). Here, Friedman identi-
7Carnap himself considers several different bases with different basic relations, as mentioned above.
8More precisely, any use of recollection-of-similarity is reduced to quantification over founded relations
which satisfy the correct empirical constraints. We want to thank an anonymous reviewer for this nice
phrasing.
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fies the notion of foundedness with the possibility of the second option for breathing
meaning into a statement other than structural definite descriptions: the possibility
of ostensions. Indeed, this seems to be a contradiction of Carnap’s original constitu-
tional programme at first glance. In §13 of the Aufbau Carnap clearly states that the
following construction will show the possibility of a purely structural constitutional
system that is obtained not a priori but in a constructive way. For Friedman, this
amounts to a fundamental problem:
If we succeed in disengaging objective meaning and knowledge from ostension and lodge
them instead in logical form or structure, then we run the risk of divorcing objective mean-
ing and knowledge from any relation to experience or the empirical world at all. We run the
risk, that is, of erasing the distinction between empirical knowledge and logico-mathematical
knowledge. (Friedman, 1999a, p. 103)
Although we can follow this analysis by Friedman, we do not agree with his assess-
ment. For us, this is not a desperate attempt by Carnap to solve his constitutional
project but rather a reasonable solution within the world of thought of the Aufbau.
However, we will argue that Carnap was justified to move on after the Aufbau to-
wards a verificationist programme andwewill try to explain that development, based
on our analysis.
2 LOGIC ANDMATHEMATICS IN THE AUFBAU
2.1 LOGICISM IN THE AUFBAU
Pivotal for the deliberations to come will be a closer look at what Carnap says about
the epistemic value of logic in the Aufbau. We are aware that Carnap’s logicism is an
extraordinarily broad topic. That is why we will limit ourselves to excerpts from his
remarks on this topic in the Aufbau. What seems to leap to the eye first is §107, where
Carnap wants to constitute logic and mathematics within the constitutional theory.
For the underlying logic (‘Logistik’; outdated term)) he clearly references Russell’s
and Whitehead’s ‘Principia Mathematica’. Insight into Carnap’s thought at the time
of the Aufbau might be given by the following passage:
[ D ] i e l o g i s c h e n u n d m a t h e m a t i s c h e n G e g e n s t ä n d e
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[ s i n d ] n i c h t e i g e n t l i c h e G e g e n s t ä n d e im Sinne der
Realgegenstände (der Objekte der Realwissenschaften) [...]. D i e L o g i k
( e i n s c h l . [ s i c ] d e r M a t h e m a t i k ) b e s t e h t n u r a u s k o n v e n -
t i o n e l l e n F e s t s e t z u n g e n über denGebrauch vonZeichen u n d a u s T a u -
t o l o g i e n auf Grund dieser Festsetzungen. (Carnap, 1998, §107, letter spacing as in
the original)9
Here, we can see that Carnap considered logic and mathematics to be based on sym-
bolic representations of mere conventions of a tautological nature, a variant of logi-
cism (cf. Tennant, 2017). What is important to mention is the emphasis on logico-
mathematical objects as non-actual objects, opposed to the actual objects of the fac-
tual sciences. Friedman (1999b, p. 126), following Lotze, identifies the meaning of
the former termwith objective, timeless validity (‘Gültigkeit’); the latter term is iden-
tified with existence. This again hints at Carnap’s neo-Kantian heritage, as Friedman
points out, since the actual objects, factual science (‘Realwissenschaft’, in Carnapian
terms) deals with, are ‘made possible’ (Friedman, 1999b, p. 126) by the non-actual.
This is because the latter is thought of as ‘governing our thought’ (ibid.). Hence, logic
and mathematics are independent of the coincidences of the actual world (‘Unab-
hängig von den Zufälligkeiten der wirklichen Welt’ (Carnap, 1998, p. XVIII)), as he
puts it later in his German introduction to the second edition of the Aufbau. Build-
ing on that, we want to take a closer look at the even more insightful §§50-51 in the
following.
2.2 LOGICAL VALUE AND EPISTEMIC VALUE
In §50 and §51, Carnap introduces the distinctionbetween the epistemic value (‘Erken-
ntniswert’) of a statement and its logical value (‘logischer Wert’). The former is given
as the sense according to the imagination of the statement in question. The latter
term refers to its truth value. By executing the programme of constitutional theory,
one reduces statements about the objects we are concerned with by means of con-
stitutional, i.e., explicit, definitions,10 only containing the basic relation. This means
9English translation (Carnap, 1937, §107, emphasis as in the original): ‘It is important to notice that the
logical and mathematical objects are not actually objects in the sense of real objects (objects of the em-
pirical sciences). Logic (including mathematics) consists solely of conventions concerning the use of symbols,
and of tautologies based on these conventions.’
10We are aware that Carnap actually considers several different types of definitions in the Aufbau (cf.
Carnap, 1998, §38-39), including the infamous definitions-in-use. We also know that this has been an
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that both statement functions (‘Aussagefunktionen’), the one before and the one after
the reduction, are equal in extension. The transformation process could potentially
lead to an epistemically meaningful statement being transformed into a mere trivial-
ity if only the logical value is preserved. So, as Carnap puts it, constitutional transla-
tions are weaker than language translations since the formermerely preserves logical
value; but the latter preserves epistemic value in addition to that.
3 AVOIDANCE OF TRIVIALISATION: A DEFENCE OF FOUNDEDNESS
We hold that these paragraphs, §§50-51, are key to settling Friedman’s doubts about
the notion of foundedness. Carnapwas verymuch aware—aswe have just seen—that
the constitutional project could run the risk of turning epistemologically meaningful
statements into trivialities, even before introducing the notion of foundedness. Since
logico-mathematical truths are considered to be conventionally true and constitu-
tional theory is only worried about preserving logical value, it needs only a true (em-
pirical) statement to be put into the constitutional-definitional reduction machinery
to possibly make it trivial.
3.1 THREE CONDITIONS
To avoid such trivialisation, one must employ three conditions:
1. First, at no step of the constitutional system must there be a statement that is
true merely by logico-mathematical (for us: conventional) means.
2. Second, we must ensure that our basic relation is itself empirical.
3. Third, we must be able to determine all instances of the basic relation in the
constitutional system as true.
apple of discord in the literature: Coffa (1991, p. 221-222), and the response in Friedman (1999a, p. 98).
We will stick to Carnap‘s own definition in §51 which holds explicit definitions to be substitution rules.
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3.2 NO CONVENTIONAL TRUTH IN CARNAP’S CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
3.2.1 No necessity
How does Carnap ensure these conditions are met? Logic and mathematics are, as
mentioned above, constituted before the actual constitutional system. In fact, logic
and mathematics are not constituted at all, as constituting an object means its reduc-
tion to the basic relation by means of logic. But logic is conventionally true; it does
not require empirical input for its justification; mathematics, on the other hand, is re-
ducible to logic. That is, why logic is constitutionally, i.e. logico-epistemically, prior
to the actual constitutional system.11 One needs logic to constitute the constitutional
system, but no element of the constitutional system is necessary to define logic. Vice
versa, we do not need to define basic concepts of logic within our constitutional sys-
tem, although logic is necessary for its construction since it was already there in the
first place. This means that it is not necessary to construct a logically true statement
in Carnap’s constitutional system at any stage; still, is it possible?
3.2.2 No possibility
The specific form of the constitutional system is defined by the statements about its
objects. These are fixed by the scientific indicators (sufficient, temporarily preceding
conditions) of the (empirical) basic states of affairs underlying the objects in question
(cf. Carnap, 1998, §49). All relational descriptions taken from those and all structural
descriptions, in turn, abstracted from the relational ones are ultimately based on the
indicators of the empirical states of affairs. Thus, structural descriptions over the
domain of scientifically relevant objects do always contain empirical content. Since
some structural descriptions, namely those which are sufficient to describe all sci-
entific concepts definitely, are the constituents of Carnapian constructional system,
this contains empirical content in any statement at any level of the constitution. As
we see, it is impossible to have a logically true statement at any step of the constitu-
tion.12
11This priority is also mirrored in the paragraph structure of the Aufbau.
12As an anonymous reviewer urged us to clarify, ‘system’ here does not refer to Carnap’s entire language
but to the unlabelled graph network, based on the basic relation. Although Carnap makes use of tauto-
logies when constructing the constitutional network, all tautologies are already available to him prior
to the constitution, including those containing empirical objects, as we argued in 3.2.1.
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3.2.3 Empirical content and definite description
This is also related to the first criterion Carnap imposes on the elimination proced-
ure of the basic relation in §§153-155, as explained above: the basic relation should
be definitely described (in purely structural terms) by the inner-constitutional prop-
erties of the objects constituted from it. Since the basic relation is empirical, which
is what motivated Carnap to eliminate it in the first place, it cannot be described by
purely logico-mathematical statements but only by statements also containing em-
pirical value. Hence, the statements used for the structural definite description of the
basic relation must contain empirical content.
3.3 THE EMPIRICAL NATURE OF THE BASIC RELATION
3.3.1 The importance of an empirical basic relation for constitution theoretical epistemology
What has not been discussed yet is whether the basic relation is actually empirical.
This is indeed a profound problem, as this is not granted by the setting of the con-
stitutional theory. We might be mistaken about whether the relation which we have
taken as the starting point for the constitution does indeed hold between objects in
the world. At the point of the constitution where the basic relation is introduced,
only pure logic is yet available as a tool for logico-epistemological justification, as
we have just seen. Modelling the different steps of the constitutional system after
empirical content, the indicators of the basic states of affairs, is again only logico-
epistemologically justified if the basic relation itself is empirical. This is the case
since—strictly speaking—the objects of the constitution are, for constitution theory,
mere derivations of the basic relation. In other words, the only part of the defini-
tion of the objects of the constitution theory which is not just pure logic is the basic
relation. If the basic relation is not empirical, we cannot guarantee that all scientific-
epistemological statements will not simply become mere trivialities as soon as we
apply logico-definitional methods on them. Instead of having provided a frame-
work for the discourse of empirical science, we would have merely created a math-
ematical playground without any relation to the actual world. It is essentially at
odds with Carnap’s aim of eliminating metaphysically charged language forms for
the very reason of its lack of empirical content. However, if we cannot feel assured
that Carnap’s construction is based on an empirical basic relation, it is in danger of
becoming subject to the same criticism. For a constitution theorist, epistemology
itself is in danger here.
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3.3.2 Foundedness as the ‘bug fix’
There is no way out of this problem by the given means at this point of the Aufbau.
We need a ‘bug fix’. The solution, which Carnap himself supplies, is the notion of
‘foundedness’. This is exactly what we need: our problem is that we only have pure
logic available to justify the empirical status of the basic relation (or better: that it is
logico-empistemologically justified to use an empirical basic relation). ‘Foundedness’
is, as it happens, exactly that: a basic notion of pure logic. The reasons for Carnap to
introduce this notion read exactly as the obstacles of our current situation: founded-
ness cannot be deduced from pure logic, nor is it part of any outer-logical field (cf.
Carnap, 1998, §154).
3.3.3 The redemption of foundedness
What seems to be a drastic and desperate step by Carnap is a well-conceived sug-
gestion to directly target the problem of the application of logic and mathematics in
constitutional theory, perhaps even in scientific discourse in general. Logic is purely
conventional and therefore the statements deduced from it are a priori true. The
same holds for mathematics since it is reducible to logic (we must keep in mind that
we are in the world of thought of the Aufbau here, which is logicist). But in the case
of constitutional theory and science, we do not wantmere a priori truths. Instead, we
want empirical content to determine the truth of the statements in question. At the
same time, we want to make objective, i.e. inter-subjectively communicable, state-
ments about the world, which Carnap, as we have seen before, considers requiring
the form of structural definite descriptions. In other words, we want to formalise
the empirical input from empirical sources. Constitutional theory aims to provide
the means for that. Foundedness ensures in this picture that, although we employ
formal methods, our epistemological framework for discourse and investigation in
science is in the end empirical. Instead of erasing the distinction between empirical
and logico-mathematical knowledge, of which Friedman accuses Carnap for intro-
ducing foundedness as a logical primitive, Carnap saves what is crucial for consti-
tution theory and for the framework of scientific discourse it wants to provide: a
distinction between the empirical and logical parts of the constitution.13
The last remaining question of the three stated above is: can we make out the
sentences in the construction, which are instances of the basic relation, as being true?
13The difficulty Carnap encounters in the Aufbau in making clear this distinction and the fatal problem
of foundedness, which we will argue for in the following section, can be considered a foreshadowing of
the Carnap-Quine debate on analyticity (see Leitgeb and Carus, 2020).
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We think that Carnap holds this statement to be true. This is the actual Achilles’ heel
of the Aufbau as we will see in the next and last section of this essay.
4 TOWARDS THE VIENNA STAGE
4.1 SELF-CONTRADICTIONS IN CARNAP’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY
A major point of concern for the neo-Kantian interpreters of the Aufbau is the ap-
parent self-contradiction Carnap displays in his intellectual autobiography. Here, he
writes:
[The Vienna Circle] assumed that there was a certain rock bottom of knowledge of the im-
mediately given, which was indubitable. Every other kind of knowledge was supported by
this basis and therefore likewise decidable with certainty. This was the picture which I had
given in the Logischer Aufbau; it was supported by the influence of Mach’s doctrine of the
sensations as the elements of knowledge, by Russell’s logical atomism, and finally by Wit-
tgenstein’s thesis that all propositions are truth-functions of the elementary propositions.
(Carnap, 1963, p. 57)
Carnap—in retrospect—takes a stance on the purpose of the Aufbau which seems
significantly different to the neo-Kantian position, such as Friedman’s (as described
in this essay). This approach sounds much more like the positivist picture Carnap
embraced after he became part of the Vienna Circle (after writing the Aufbau): the
meaning of a sentence depends on its verification (cf. Stöltzer and Uebel, 2006, pp.
XXXVIII-XL), in the terminology of the Aufbau: on the ostension of the basic objects
which are mentioned in it and their inter-relations. This is an open contradiction to
the structuralist conception of meaning which we have reconstructed under a neo-
Kantian reading in this essay. Friedman (1999b, chapter IV, pp. 145-152) explains the
issue by denying that Carnap refers to his own motivations here. Instead, Friedman
thinks that Carnap illustrates the ideological reception of the Aufbau in the intellec-
tual climate of the Vienna Circle. We are not fully convinced by Friedman’s explan-
ation for the apparent dissonance between the Aufbau and Carnap’s later view on it
andwewant to offer the sketch of a slightly different solution in the following section.
An anonymous reviewer of this paper pointed out that they consider Tsou’s view
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(Tsou, 2003) close to the account presented in this paper. We want to seize this op-
portunity to point out how his paper indeed differs from ours. Tsou merges the two
dominant readings of the Aufbau in his essay: he agrees with the neo-Kantian inter-
pretation, which we have endorsed in this essay, insofar as he shares their reading of
the Aufbau as essentially concerned with the question of an objective framework for
empirical science. However, he also agrees that Carnap’s reductionistmethodology is
significantly connected to objective empirical conditions of justification in the form
of his reductionist methodology. This latter claim is at odds with the neo-Kantian
interpreters and in agreement with the older line of readings of the Aufbau, tracing
back to Quine. This family of interpretations reads the Aufbau in the Russellian tra-
dition of British empiricism as well as, retrospectively, from the Carnapian papers of
the days of the Vienna Circle. Under this reading, Carnap is indeed looking to find a
‘rock bottom of knowledge’ from the introductory quote in the Aufbau. We disagree
with this second component of Tsou’s reading: we do not think that Carnap’s motiv-
ation for the Aufbau is based on any Russellian project looking for a ‘rock bottom of
knowledge’ but essentially concerned with questions of objectivity. Instead, we want
to suggest that it was indeed the open questions of the Aufbau which have motivated
Carnap tomove to amore Russellian project in his later Vienna days. Unlike Tsou, we
do not seek to dispense with or modify the neo-Kantian reading; but rather we want
to stay faithful to it. Our aim is merely to give an alternative rational explanation for
Carnap’s later autobiographical self-contradictions.
4.2 A RATIONAL EXPLANATION
As we have said in the last section, we need some principle which allows us to re-
cognise the truth of all instances of the basic relation in the constitutional system to
make the constitution function. We think that Carnap was aware of this fact and the
incompleteness of the Aufbau in that regard when he published it for the first time in
1928. This would explain why the core idea of a fully structural constitutional sys-
tem and, thus, the elimination of the basic relation is so little emphasised throughout
the Aufbau: neither is it mentioned in §1 which sets the goals of the project nor in
§156 where the theses of the Aufbau are explicitly listed. §§153-155, in which the
elimination of the basic relation takes place and where the notion of foundedness is
introduced, are even labelled ‘can be omitted’ (‘überschlagbar’). We think that thiswas
due toCarnap’s awareness of the lacking keystonewhichwould show the indubitable
truth of the instances the (founded) basic relation in his construction.
84 The New Collection, Volume 14, 2020
The central piece of evidence for this thesis is the enthusiastic adoption of veri-
fication as the criterion for meaningful sentences, which was adopted by Carnap
right after the publication of the Aufbau (cf. Stöltzer and Uebel, 2006, pp. XXXVIII-
XL). Only after Carnap had adopted verificationism was the missing keystone for
the project of constitutional theory found since verificationism provides an offer for
the ‘rock bottom of knowledge’,14 a truth-determining principle for all scientific sen-
tences, which is absent in the Aufbau. Certainly, the empiricist Carnap’s verification-
ism is very much at odds with the structural conception of meaning which serves as
the backbone of the Aufbau.15 However, many other leitmotifs of the Aufbau per-
sist in Carnap’s philosophical work and later re-appear in his Die logische Syntax der
Sprache (Carnap, 1934)16.
Unlike Friedman, we do not have tomake the case formere irrational ‘peer pres-
sure’ to explain the verificationist stage in Carnap’s philosophical life and his later
view on the Aufbau; but, we can offer a rational and philosophical reason: by mov-
ing on to the Vienna station Carnap saw a chance to find answers to the last open
question of the Aufbau.
Summary: foundedness defended
According to the Aufbau, every scientifically meaningful statement can be translated
into a structural one. This translation is necessary to achieve inter-subjectively com-
municable, or better: objective, discourse. This is the major focal point of the neo-
Kantian interpreters of the Aufbau.
In the Aufbau, Carnap constitutes every scientific object along the logico-
epistemological order of cognition by means of logical definition. The basic rela-
tion, the recollection of similarity, is the only empirical entity in that construction.
Every other object in the constitutional theory is generated from it. In order to ac-
complish the goal of the Aufbau, the objectivisation of scientific discourse, Carnap
eliminates the basic relation by structural definite description in terms of high order
objects constituted from it and by introducing a novel notion, called ‘foundedness’ as
a basic concept of logic.
For the logicist Aufbau, logic and mathematics are of purely conventional and
tautological nature. Two statements have the same logical value if they are equal in
extension. Constitutional transformations preserve logical value, but they do not
preserve epistemic value. This property shows a risk of trivialisation into which the
Aufbau could run, as constitutional definitions can possibly turn epistemicallymean-
14Cf. the quote in the beginning of this essay.
15We would like an anonymous reviewer for urging us to make this point explicit.
16Or in English: ‘The logical syntax of language’ (Carnap, 1937).
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ingful statements into logical truths, or in Carnap’s thought: trivialities.
We argued that this problemcanbe avoided if three conditions are fulfilled. First,
at no step of the constitutional system must there be a statement that is true merely
by logico-mathematical means. Second, we must ensure that our basic relation is it-
self empirical. Third, we must be able to determine all instances of the basic relation
in the constitutional system as true.
The first condition is satisfied since logic and mathematics are constituted out-
side the constitutional system and since every statement in the constitutional system
is ultimately based on its corresponding underlying state of affairs. The second cri-
terion is not ensured by the constitutional system itself, aswe have seen. Nonetheless,
foundedness turned out to be the ideal ‘bug fix’ for this problem.
In the last section of the essay, we gave an outlook on how our prior invest-
igations can be used to offer a better explanation than Friedman’s ‘Vienna recep-
tion’ thesis for the change in Carnap’s later self-reception of his project in the Aufbau
and his philosophical development after the Aufbau. What the Aufbau had failed to
provide, verificationismwas able to supply: a justification for the truth of all instances
of the basic relation in his constitution, a ‘rock bottom of [scientific] knowledge’.
We are aware that this essay is a mere informal brief sketch of our reading of
foundedness. However, it is intended to set the stage for a later elaborated formal
treatment of our reading of foundedness. It, additionally, shows the attractiveness of
our reading for a philosophical understanding of Carnap’s verificationist turn during
his Vienna days.
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